Tuesday, April 27, 2010

the limits of Rambam's rationalism

I dug into the copy of Maimondides, Spinoza, and Us – Toward and Intellectually Vibrant Judaism by Rabbi Marc Angel, PhD that I picked up from the library on my train ride today. The good: if you know nothing about the Rambam or Spinoza, this may not be a bad place to start. The bad: Rabbi Angel’s polemical attacks against those whom he takes issue with. It starts from the preface, where Rabbi Angel refers to “thousands of people [who] suspend their reason in order to follow the dictates of their “rebbes” or halakhic authorities,” and it gets progressively worse. Perhaps Rabbi Angel expects his congregants to simply follow their own sense of reason rather than seek his halakic guidance, but after hearing him out I am less than convinced of the correctness of such an approach.

The book's title is a misnomer for a number of reasons, the first of which is that it is less about Maimonides than a screed aimed at those who take issue with Rabbi Angel’s point of view. He describes his opponents as fundamentalists, obscurantists, authoritarian, and superstitious, while seldom offering quotes or examples that would support such claims. On the other hand, as I will explain next post, he lets pass without comment the most strained readings so long as they can be used in support of his own position. Not only is criticism aimed at those who clearly identify with the right-wing, but even the OU is chastised (p. 109) for the their setting up a service whereby people could request that Torah scholars recite psalms for them and insert a kvitel in the kosel on their behalf. Rabbi Angel questions, “Doesn’t Judaism believe that G-d is always present and listening everywhere?” I wonder what purpose Rabbi Angel’s synagogue serves when G-d could just as easily be approached in a public park on in the confines of one’s den. Not only are modern thinkers and organizations the subject of Rabbi Angel's ire, but even the words of the Gaon of Vilna are described as “shocking examples of a defective, superstition worldview.” (p. 101)

There are a number of flaws with Rabbi Angel’s approach.

The first question that we need to address is whether a philosophy of Judaism can be constructed based purely on rational metaphysics. To Rabbi Angel’s credit, he repeatedly concedes that the answer is a resounding No. For example, in describing how one gets from the philosophical G-d of first cause to the personal G-d of Judaism, Rabbi Angel explains that the “Rambam required us to make a ‘leap of faith.’” (p. 27) He further elaborates, “Although Rambam was a rationalistic philosopher, he understood that not all truth was attainable through the efforts of human reason.” (p. 31) Rabbi Angel coins the term “meta-reason” to describe these areas where we must fall back on sources other than our intellect. We know these areas of “meta-reason” to be true, “…because we have an authoritative tradition of revelation and because we personally experience it to be true.” (p. 34) Even with respect to proof of G-d’s existence, Rabbi Angel shies away from philosophical proofs and writes that, “We don’t need to prove G-d’s existence; we feel His presence and we know He is there.” (p. 37) On the role of tradition, Rabbi Angel notes that Rambam’s “…willingness to rely on faith in the biblical and rabbinic tradition need not be seen as a “compromise” with reason, but as an open-eyed admission of the limits of reason.” (p. 65)

Given this direction, one is left wondering why Rabbi Angel is so harshly dismissive of those with whom he disagrees. The Hareidi world does not reject the use of reason in toto, but instead simply takes a stronger position on its limits. Would Rabbi Angel describe the Vilna Gaon’s Judaism as lacking in “intellectual vibrancy,” the term he seems to reserve only for his own brand of Rambam-inspired rationalism? That such a description strikes us as absurd demonstrates the falsity of attempting to equate rejection of the Rambam with irrational extremism. Once one accepts that we are not dealing with a question of either/or, but rather of finding a proper balance between reason and "meta-reason", labeling those who take a different view than one's own as "fundamentalists" seems itself to be a critique grounded in personal opinion rather than intellectual substance.

The main thesis of the book is that Rambam's rationalism was tempered by tradition and therefore falls short of Spinoza's more extreme formulation. One cannot help but sense that his own thesis undercuts Rabbi Angel's own claims of following in the Rambam's footsteps. Might not his right wing opponents claim that it is they, in keeping to this spirit of moderation against the forces of pure reason, who are in fact the true heirs to the Rambam's legacy?


Rabbi Angel himself notes that “Rambam’s attempt to harmonize the Torah’s teaching with Aristotelian philosophy rings false – and unnecessary – to modern readers… We may be more skeptical about what is a ‘rationally proven truth’; various philosophical and scientific ‘truths’ of one generation have later been shown to be flawed and incorrect by subsequent generations.” (p. 50) One could not ask for a better explanation for the hesitancy to reinterpret Torah simply to fit what passes for intellectual fancy.

The elephant in the room that escapes notice entirely is the question of why Rabbi Angel is so enamored of the Rambam to the exclusion of so many other important views of Rishonim and Achronim. If the barometer of truth is not pure philosophy but rather, “authoritative tradition… and because we personally experience it to be true,” to quote Rabbi Angel himself, are not the views of the Gaon, the Ramban, the Ba’al Shem, or any others which have found a place in tradition and inspire far more significant numbers of Jews than the Guide equally important and meaningful?

11 comments:

  1. But I am sure you would probably agree that while the idea of inserting a note in the Kotel is kind of silly and offering a personal tefillah would be superior, the concept of the Bet Knesset is firmly rooted in Torah and Halakha as opposed to praying in a park.

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  2. great unknown10:20 AM

    I have long suspected that this type of "extrapolation" of the Rambam was a motivation in the middle ages to ban his writings from mainstream Judaism.

    Note that this did not speak to the greatness of the Rambam himself. Unfortunately, throughout history, his writings have been used to perverse ends.

    The famous picture of the Rambam, indeed, was fabricated by a maskil
    and originally appeared with the payot by the ears completely shaved: viz
    http://onthemainline.blogspot.com/2008/04/on-that-famous-picture-of-rambam.html

    I strongly suspect that they wanted their "hero" to appear "modern", not as somebody who actually followed the chukim.

    While the Rambam certainly does not need my sympathy, I certainly have it.

    I would guess that for him, the concepts of Ahavas and Yir'as Hashem were so innate and so primary that he did not anticipate that small minds and small hearts would take his philosophical approach and use it as an excuse to redefine Judaism.

    The difference, ultimately, may lie in Rambam's internalizing of his puny infinitesimal stature before Hashem vs. the modern philosopher's arrogance in deciding what Hashem "really meant."

    In any case, an honest logician will admit that no system of logic, and hence no prescriptive system of philosophy, can exist without assumed axioms. Even the concept of absolute logic is flawed [see Hofstadter's Godel, Escher, and Bach].

    Thus, the concept of "rational proof" is irrational.

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  3. great unknown, you are a wicked, wicked, person. Matis writes books, Eisemann writes books, Krasner writes books, Anne Rice writes books, Umberto Eco writes books, every narcissist, educator and thinker with a novel perspective and a talent for putting pen to paper writes books. Or at least articles. And you? The person who knocked the Chazon Ish's talmid on his can? Out in the wilderness shooting the heck out of the landscape between your monthly baths. What right do you have to not speak and write for a wider audience?

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  4. not sure i would agree totally that note-placing is 'kind of silly' if i am not mistaken it is rooted in tradition, in the story of the CHida and the 'kvittel' (cant think of sefardi equivalent!) of his Rebbe the Ohr Hachayim hakadosh - i cant put my finger on the makor at the moment, but will dig around.

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  5. incidentally, great blog, i have been following for a while, and enjoy the Lomdus, as well as refreshing posts like this that cast a critical, honest eye over goings-on in the wider jewish world. Yasher Koach!!

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  6. Rabbi Maroof, of course halacha sees a Bet Knesset as superior to a park, which was exactly my point -- the sevara that "G-d can be found everywhere" negates all distinctions between kodesh and chol, between park and shule, and hence is an incomprehensible overreach.

    Thanks for the complement Rabbi Roberts.

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  7. "The first question that we need to address is whether a philosophy of Judaism can be constructed based purely on rational metaphysics. To Rabbi Angel’s credit, he repeatedly concedes that the answer is a resounding No."

    Why is the Kuzari excluded from the realm of "rational metaphysics"?

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  8. Re: Kuzari - Just to give you one example, Rabbi Angel claims there is no "ontological" difference between Jew and non-Jew, which he tries to prove from the Rambam. Jews get more credit because of our actions, not because there is some inherent quality to our being. (How you explain "af al pi she'chata yisrael hu" based on this is beyond me.) The Kuzari disagrees, saying even a ger is of diminished status relative to someone born Jewish. Such a statement cannot be proven from logical postulates or derived from empirical data, so Rabbi Angel is not willing to give it any credence.

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  9. The famous picture of the Rambam, indeed, was fabricated by a maskil
    and originally appeared with the payot by the ears completely shaved

    The fact is that the picture actually is based on a medallion which, IIRC, is quite old. The Rambam himself paskened that it is permitted to remove the payos with scissors, just like the beard, so it is perfectly possible that he did not have payos. He also wrote in a teshuva that there is no mitzva in having long payos.

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  10. "But I am sure you would probably agree that while the idea of inserting a note in the Kotel is kind of silly and offering a personal tefillah would be superior, the concept of the Bet Knesset is firmly rooted in Torah and Halakha as opposed to praying in a park."

    One may agree or not, but your distinction between the written word utilized to communicate with Hashem and the spoken word is arbitrary. In neither case is it "necessary" for G-d.

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  11. Anonymous9:52 AM

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